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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

a corporation,

Plaintif /-Respondent,
VS.

DAVID FRANK PATTERSON and
PEARL PATTERSON, his wife;
F. DAVID PATTERSON and
MARIE PATTERSON, his wife;
LEWIS B. PATTERSON and
RAMONA PATTERSON, his wife;
JACK B. PATTERSON and
JOAN PATTERSON, his wife,

Case No.
12968

Defendants-Appel'lant.s.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT 0}, 'THE CASE
Appellants landowners appeal from a decision of
the Second District Court of Davis County refusing
to strike the testimony of respondent condemnor's ap·
praiser and seek a new trial on the issues of severance
damages.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
On March 17, 1970, the Honorable Edward Sheya
entered a Memorandum Decision holding the 1913
Easement granted by appellants' predecessors-in-interest
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to be valid and ~n l\Iay 5, 19701 entered Vindings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law confirming to respondent
a 150 foot right-of-way over and across appellants'
property and confirming in respondent the right to
erect an additional transmission line by paying such
amounts as were "specified or determinable" to the then
landowners.
At trial on l\Iarch 17, 1972, appellants moved to
strike the testimony of respondent's appraiser, claiming
such testimony was based upon an enoneous legal as·
sumption. The trial court denied the motion. After the
jury returned its verdict denying severance damages to
the "Dix" Parcel, appellants moved for a new trial
on the issue of severance damages or, in the alternative,
for addittur of $13,000.00. This latter motion was de·
nied, the court finding the verdict to be within the
reasonable range of testimony presented at trial.
RELIEF SOUGH1.' ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the trial .court should be
affirmed in all particulars and appellants' request for
new trial be denied.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS

.
· _. terest
On July 2 8, 1913, cert am predecessors-m Jil
.
f f
right-of-way
of appellants entered into a series o our
C
predecesso.1
agreements with the Utah Power ompany,
foot
of respondent, granting the Power Company a 150
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ensernent for the construction, erection and maintenance of electric transmission lines. Each of the agreements provided that the Power Company could erect
and maintain additional towers on the Easement by paying to the then landowner a stipulated amount at the
time such tower or towers were erected.
The particular right-of-way agreement which is the
subject of this litigation applied to a portion of appella11ts' property known as the "Dix" parcel and set forth
the duties and obligations of the Power Company should
iL exercise the right to construct additional towers. The
specific language, pertinent herein, is as follows:
(The Power Company) agrees at all times
hereafter, to save and keep (appellants' predecessors) and their heirs, harmless of and from
all damages which they, or either of them, may
suffer as a result of the exercise of the right,
privilege and authority herein granted, and to
pay all damages which (appellants' predecessors) or their heirs may suffer from the construction, erection, operation, maintenance or
repair of, or damage or injury by any tower
. . . lines placed on the premises above described under the right, privilege and authority
granted. ( R. 9, Ex. "A").
ii
.y

Respondent filed suit against appellants averring
its intent to exercise the right given it in the July 28,
1918 agreement and tendered to appellants the requisite
arnount established in the easement agreement for the
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erection• of two towers on the "Dix" 1>arcel
·, tJ1ts' tender
'
was ref used. ~ R. 4). The parties stipulated certain
facts surround.mg the creation of the easements (R.
30-34). On .March 17, 1970, the Honorable Edwara
Shey a, sitting by invitation, issued a Memorandum Decision holding each of the easements legal, valid ano
binding upon the parties in all respects. (R. 29). On
.May 5, 1970, Judge Sheya entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law providing in pertinent part:
Findings of' lj..,act para. 9. That the grant.ors
in said 1~~asemc11ts (Bx. "A" through "K",
inclusive) intended to and did grant to plain·
tiff an expandable easement within the scope
of the 150 foot right of way conveyed by which
plaintiff was given a present right to construct
one or more structures and the further right,
upon making future additional payment in
amounts specified, to construct such additional
structures as it desired.
Conclusions of Law para. 8. That upon pay·
ment of the appropriate additional amounts to
defendants, as specified and/ or determinable
in the easements, a Decree shall be issued quiet·
ing plaintiff's title to said Easement.s and ~·e·
straining defendants from interfermg w1~h
plaintiffs exercise of its rights under said
Easements. ( R. 47)
.
. the court an d counsel
On the mornmg
of trial,
. met
.
h .
f law mvolv·
t o discuss among other thmgs, t e issues o
'
"D'ix"Ease-.
ed in J udo-e Sheya's interpretation of the
o
1 d "''1 . terpretatllll
ment. Judge Ronald 0. llydc rue ' .1_,. Y 10
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of the Dix Agreement is that the phrasing 'all damages'
opens it up. It means, as stated, 'all damages'." {T., p.
7) .1 Counsel for respondent queried as to the Court's
receiving evidence on the issue of severance damages
and was advised that the court would do so on the "Dix"
par<'el. ( T,. pg. 7) Respondent's counsel objected to
that niling.
On direct examination of respondent's appraiser,
l\fr. Marcellus Palmer, counsel framed a question as to
whether the erection of the second power transmission
line, which was constructed in 1968, within the 150 foot
easement crente<l an additional burden on the remaining ground withjn the "Dix" parcel. Mr. Palmer testified:
First of all as to the reasons, we have an easement here, and I have been advised by counsel
that it is a legal and legitimate easement, and
it provided certain uses, not use. As I understand it. it provides certain uses that would
travel along with the real property in the easement from then on, and in my opinion the construction of a second power line within the
bounds of the easement did not create anything
new and different as to the remaining property, the supporting properties along the sides
of the easement, because it was already provided in the easement. I sec no additional uses

--1

The portion of transcript containing testimony by Mr. P~tterson
and Mr. Barlow will he denominated "T,"; the transcript con·
taining testimony of Mr. Palmer will be denominated ''T2"•
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there
. . that affects the marketability
• of the remammg property. ( T2. p. 10-11).
On cross-examination, counsel for appellants engaged in the following dialogue with .Mr. Palmer:
Q. Now, if we assume further that in the
easement that was drafted in 1913 there was a
provision that the damages, if any, to this additional strip affected by the towers and the
lines was to be determined in 1968 when the
line was placed there, would you say then that
there should be no damages assigned to that
Dix field?

A. I think so. I see no change in the physical
facts. There was 150 feet easement that was
taken, knowing and specifying within the
writing of it that there would be lines built on
it. There is nothing different here. It is just
sort of carrying out what is anticipated. (T2.
p. 21)
and further:
Q. (By l\Ir. J:<'uller). All right. Now, if
we take that assumption, l\fr. Palmer, and as·
sume that we had one tower line and an easement with nothing on it except that, and then
we were to be paid for the damages for th~
additional towers and lines, that would constl·
.
tute a severance , 1ia lion;
wouldn 't I't?·

A.
Q.

Oh, yes, it sure would.
And that would affect not only the re-
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mainder of the easement area but possibly
could affect the adjoining land?
A.

Yes, depending on how it was worded.

Q. Yes. Have you any opinion as to the
amount of such severance damages under that
condition, or have you had illlY opportunity to
study it?

A. '""ell, I studied the whole property with
that thing in mind, and I have given y<ou my
determination. ( T2. p. 23)
Appellants subsequently called their appraiser, Mr.
Haven J. Barlow, and elicited testimony indicating severance damages on the "Dix" parcel of $13,000. At the
conclusion of l\'Ir. Barlow's testimony, appellants' counsel moved to strike the testimony of respondent's appraiser alleging that such testimony was premised on n
faulty and erroneous legal assumption. After hearing
argument, the trial court denied the Motion. (T. p. 96).
At the conclusion of appellants' presentation, the
court instructed the jury that the burden of proving
value of the property being acquired by respondent.
and the burden of proving damages to the property
that remain, if any, are burdens which the law placed
upon appellants and that such burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. 56) •
The court instructed specifically as to the "Dix" parcel:
·with respect to the "Dix place", containing
80 acres of land, vou are instructed that the

8
~ourt has ruled ~s a matter of law that def en<lants are entitled
.
. to
. . damages· resu It'mg
fro.m construction achv1hes; and, in addition
def ernlants are also entitled to recover ti '
l
'f
ie
~ amages, I any, to that piece of land resultmg from the dimunition in its fair market
Yalue by reason of the erection of the towers
and transmission lines across the tract. This
ruling of the Court has been predicated upon
the language of the 1913 easement which
leaves open the additional element of damages
to the "Dix Place" itself at such time as the
additional towers and transmission lines should
be installed. ( R. 57) .

The Court then instructed the jury regarding opinioo
evidence:
You should consider such expert. opinion and
should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it.
You are not hound, however, by such an opin·
ion. Give it the weight to which you deem it en·
titled whether that be great or slight, and you
may reject it if, in your judgment, .the reasons
given for it are unsound. (R. 63).
The jury returned special interrogatories and foundnij
severance damage to the "Dix" parcel. ( R. 74) ·
Appellants filed a Motion for New Trial, or in~
Alternative for an A<lditur, of $13,000.00. This Motio~
was briefed and argued; on June 7, 1972, Judge Hyoi
denied the Motion having found the verdict to have~
·
sented 3,
within the reasonable range of testimony pre
trial. ( R. 92) .
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY D~
NIED APPELLANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
THE TES1T:UONY OF RESPONDENT'S APPRAISER.
Appellants contend that the testimony of respondent's appraiser, l\Ir. J\Iarcellus Palmer, should have
been stricken by the trial court because "it was based
upon an erroneous legal assumption". (Appellants'
llrief, page 12) . A review of the record indicates, without doubt, the correctness of the trial court's refusal so
to strike. Prior to trial, counsel and the Court discussed
at some length the issues to be submitted to the trier
of fact. One was the issue of severance damages---damages to the remaining ground caused by the construction
of the public facility.
Respondent argued that the only damages to which
appellants were entitled were on-premises damages occasioned by construction activities and specifically denied that there had been any loss or damage to appellants hy reason of the imposition of the second power
transmission line. ( T., p. 3). Appellants contended the
"Dix" parcel must be considered separately and that
severance damages could be shown thereon. The Court
ruled that it would hear severance damages as to the
"Dix" parcel. Based upon this ruling, to which respon-
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dent strenuously ohjeeted, the appraiser called h'
spondent was specifically asked his opinion as to wh!t~:
there had been a severance damage in the f
f
. .
orm o au
additional burden created by the constmction of the
second power transmission line in 1968 and, if he found
such a burden, whether the fair market value of appe].
lant's propery had been reduced thereby. Mr. Palmer
categorically denied the existence of any severance
damage:
First of all as to the reasons, we have an easement here, and I have been advised hv counsel
that it is a legal and legitimate ease~ent and
it provided certain uses, not use. As I understand it, it provides certain uses that would
travel along with the real property in that
easement from then on, and in my opinion the
construction of a second power line within the
bounds of the easement did not create anything new and different as to the remaining
property, the supporting properties along the
sides of the easement, because it was already
provided in the easement. I see no additional
uses there that affects the marketability of the
remaining property. (T2. p. 10-11)
On cross-examination counsel for appellants at·
tempted to discredit l\lr. Palmer's testimony and ~u~
jected him to a thorough and comprehensive exaIDJil3•
- o f h is
· opm1on.
· ·
Counsel o~
tion concerning the bases
tained a statement from Mr. Palmer that und~r th;
facts of this case and considering the interpretationo
the easement given by Judge Hyde, a potential sev·
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erance situation did exist. Counsel then queried, "Have
you any opinion as to the amount of such severance
damage under that condition, or have you had any opportm1ity to study itl (T2. p. 23) Mr. Palmer responded, "\Vell, I studied the whole property with that thing
in mind, and I have given you my determination". ( T2.
p. 23). Counsel for appellant next reviewed with Mr.
Palmer the items of damages which appellants contended were proximately caused by the imposition of the
second line but was unable to weaken Mr. Palmer's
position that there had been no severance damage.
It is incredible that appelJants attempt to argue
that l\Ir. Palmer's testimony was based on an erroneous
legal assumption when their counsel specfically framed
a question to l\lr. Palmer on all fours with the trial
court's interpretation of the damage provision and was
informed that, in the witness's opinion, there was no
such damage. Appellants' argument leaves one to
suspect that the real difficulty with Mr. Palmer's testimony from appellants' point of view is that his appraisal
varied from appellants'. This is not a valid objection to
competency of evidence. 'Vhatever deficiencies or unsoundness which may have existed in this testimony do
not go to its competency, but to its weight and credibility which was for the jury to pass upon. Brereton v.
Di,ron, 20 Utah 2d 64, 483 P.2d 8 (1967).

If appellants' counsel was of the opinion that Mr.
P11lmer had made a gross err or was so muddled in his
thinking as to be unable to comprehend the issue of

.
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severance damacre
to the "Dix" Parcel ' t) ie opportunity
.
• !:">
•
to
this pomt was presented him on eross-exam.·
. develop
.
mation. The fact that counsel chose not to do so k
f
·t l f' C
1 ·
spea 1
. or I se . ,onnse dICl not have one additional question
m regard
to Mr. Palmer's assumptions after the witn esi
. ..
testif 1ed that he lm(l fully coHsidered the issue and coula
find no severance damages. As was pointed out buJ th'I!
Court in Board of Education of Salt Lal,·c City v. Both·
'Well and ,'-,'rcancr Co., 16 Utah 2d 341, 400 P.2d 56!
( 1965) it is the duty of the opponent to prove on cros1examination that the witness did not know what he wa1
talking about. Counsel attempted to discredit l\Ir. Pal·
mer's testimony but the trial court conectly held that
the testimony and the basis therefor were before the jurr
and it was for the jury to make of them what it would
The factors utilized by an expert witness are alwa)'i
subject of proper cross-examination to test the witnesi'!
credibility. Cit.11 of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 20~
Kan. 689, 481 P.2d 950 ( 1971); the basis for and the
weight to he given an expert's opinion should he left
for the a(lYocates to challenge and for· the jury to d~
termine. Dolan t'. lllitchcll, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972)
After blandly ignoring the record, appellants at·
tempt to buttress their flimsy argument by castegatin~
both respondent's counsel and witness. This Court will
not be swayed by such tactics and will look clos~ly to
determine which siJe, if either, committed any unp~
1!
priety. Counsel .for respon dent ask ed his appraiser
.
• • I"me creat ed a n additions.I bur
the second transmission

1e

ft

1~

prir
r ii

b~
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den. ( 'f 2. p. I 0) , Appellant characterizes this question
as being "in complete disregard of the prior ruling of
the Court". ( Appcllauts' llrief', p. 11), and fmther,
"Counsel's attempt to circumvent the Court's ruling by
speaking in terms of injury or burden instead of damage should not be countenanced by this Cowt". (Appellants' Brief, p. 12). It is clear that this question
broached the issue of severance damages to elicit a response from the appraiser as to his expert opinion on this
issue.
Hespomlcnt was properly given the opportunity to
ask its witness if severance existed. This question was
not in contravention of the court's ruling; it set the issue
for the jury to determine. Appellants then attack the
field investigation conducted by Mr. Palmer and characterize it as "a mere recitation of counsel's instructions". (Appellants' Brief, p. 12). Besides being an affront to both counsel and witness, this allegation disregards the record which shows that :Mr. Palmer visited
the site on three separate occasions ( T2 Pg. 9). Mr.
Palmer gave a comprehensive basis for his opinion on
the severance issue. l\lr. Barlow, appellants' appraiser,
parroted the landowners position and was obviously felt
by the jury to be not worthy of belief.
Appellants also allege that the trial court made a
preliminary determination of the existence of severance
damages. "Certainly the judge would not have ruled
that damages could be recovered if he had not recognized an injury or additional burden." (Appellants'

14.

lhief, pg. 11-12). This allegation is ridiculous. The trial
court was always very careful to delineate t}11's ·
•
.
•
•
'
· ISSUe ano
aclv1se ~he ~ury that it, the trier of fact, would make the
cletermmahon as to whether appellants suffered an
damages as a result of the activities of respondent. Se;
Instruction No. 2 : "The burden of proving damages to
the property that remains, if any, are burdens whicn
the law places on the defendant landowners". (R. 56),
Instruction No. 3: "Defendants are also entitled to 1~
cover the damages, if any, to that piece of land result·
ing from the dimunition in its fair market value by
reason of the erection of the tower and transmission
lines across the tract". (lt. 57). Instruction No. 10:
"Except as such damages have been stipulated you sha~
make awards in such amounts, if any, as you shall d~
termine under the evidence and the instructions given
to you relative to the burden of proof". (R. 64). To
eliminate any confusion on this point, the trial court
gave an instruction specifically requested by respondent
as Instruction No. 14:
The fact that the con rt has instructed you con·
ccrning damages is not to he taken as any in·
dication that the Court either believes or does
not believe that defendant landowners are en·
titled to recover such damages. The instructi?ns
in reference to damaaes are given as a guide
in case vou find fro; a preponderance of the
evidenc~ that the defendant landowners are en·
titled to recover, as it is the Court's. duty :
state to you fully all the law ap~hc~ble be
this case, but should your determwation
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that there should he no recovery, then you will
entirely disregard the instructions given you
upon the matter of damages. (R. 68).
The testimony presented by l\lr. Palmer was rele-

nmt and material to the issues to be determined hy the
trier of fact, l\I r. Palmer gave his reasons for finding
no seYerance damage on the "Dix" parcel. To suggest

that this te&timony should have been stricken would require this Court to find under the rationale of State
Road Commission t'. Sillimrm, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d
347 ( HW8), that the testimony was based upon such
"palpable ignorance of the subject matter as to indicate an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge
in allowing the witness to express an opinion in the first
place." No such fact exists I Respondent would submit
that the trial court correctly and properly denied appellants' motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Palmer.
POINT II
AS THE .JURY VEUDICT, AS IT RELATED TO THE "DIX" PAUCEL, WAS WITHIN
THE UANGE OF COMPETENT 'rESTIMONY
PRESENTED A TRIAL1 APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE DENIED.
Trial in this matter consumed two full days and
involved the calling of five witnesses - two of whom
were experts on land valuations. Both appellants and
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respondent had full opportunity to present th .
.
.
•
·
e1r respective cases;
. the Jury hacl am1Jle o1Jporh1n"t
1y to ~~
uate
the testunony of each appraiser-thev• chose tobe.
1i~ve .Mr. Palmer and rendered their verdict and the
trrnl court entered its judgment thereon. Appellan~
have wholly failed to show any substantial basis forups:ttin~ them. T~is Court has oft held that all presumptions mdulged m by it will favor the validity of botli
such verdict and judgment. Ewell & Son, Inc. v. SaU
Lalec City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 128o
( 1U72).
The trial court ruled on the claims of error here
presented by appellants. It held .Mr. Palmer's testimony
to be proper and not based upon any erroneous assumption (R. 10.5). It held that no new trial should be given
because of insufficiency of the evidence. (R. 92). The
granting or denial of a motion for new trial is discretionary with the trial court. This Court has recently reaffirmed its position with regard to oven-uling the lower
court on this issue:
If reasonable minds could have found as the
jury did in this case, from the eviden~e before
it then we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs'
l\lotion for a New Trial on grounds of ins~f
ficiencv of the evidence to support the verdict.
Polles~he v. Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 .(1972),
citing llloscr v. Zions Co-op ftfercantile J111t.,
et al., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948).
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See also U11frcrsal Investment v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah
2d a:w, 440 P .2d 564 ( 1965), and Gordon v. Provo
City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391P.2d430 (1964).
The appraisers called by each side indicated areas
of agreement and areas of basic disagreement. They
agreed specifically on the value of the land taken by
respondent; both held the fair market value of the property to be $2500 per acre. (Mr. Barlow at T, p. 74),
(l\lr. Palmer at T2 p. 8). They disagreed as to the effect of the second power line on the "Dix" parcel, Mr.
Palmer finding no severance damages and Mr. Barlow
fletermining $13,000 in severance damages. The jury
believed .Mr. Palmer.
Hespondent woulcl submit that there has been no
showing of any error committed by the trial court, let
alone the substantial and prejudicial error required to
he shown before this Court will reverse; nor has there
been any indication that unfairness or injustice has rC4
suited to appellants. There is no reasonable likelihood
of any different result than that retumed by the jury
and approved by the trial court if this cause were remanded. Appellants' Motion for a New Trial should
be denied. Arnovitz v. Telfo_. 27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d
310, (1972).

CONCLUSION
Appellants have wholly failed to show any error
committed hy the trial court or the trier of fact in this
matter. The testimony of both appraisers was evaluated
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by the jury and considered in their deliberations. Thert
is no error upon which this Court could base a reversal
of the trial court. Appellants' request for a new trial on
the issue of damages should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
LeROY S. AXLAND
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondent

